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JURISPRUDENCE. By Francis P. LeBuffe and James V. Hayes. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1938. Pp. xxiii, 273.
Writing in the eighteenth century, Blackstone observed that municipal
law is "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state,
commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." To many candi-
dates for admission to the bar, this definition has had a full life by enabling
them to answer the first question quickly and correctly. Moreover, if the
examiner ever inquires, the average candidate can reflect the juristic de-
velopment of the nineteenth century and bury this definition beneath the
weight of a devastating critique. However in this little volume, Blackstone's
notion is resurrected with fitting ceremony, and in a display of zeal and
ardor reminiscent of medieval scholasticism it becomes enshrined and haloed
under the label of truth.1
The purpose of the ceremony is to find and formulate a set of funda-
mental, universally valid principles of law. The discovery of these princi-
ples is only possible by following in the footsteps of the "old masters" and,
along with them, accepting the doctrines that go to make up what is known
as natural law. In this treatise, natural law is given a theological founda-
tion entirely, and though its "immediacy may rest in reason, it proceeds
ultimately from God." 2 Hence with an Aquinian fervor for abstractions, the
underlying basis of the treatise may be illustrated by saying that law is
either good because it accords with divine existence or bad because it does
not.
Coming to the detailed content of the book, it may be said that the record
never leaves the realm of theology. Some concern is evidenced in defining
the nature of law, its origin and effect. There is a surface treatment of
what the authors call American Schools of Jurisprudence. Apparently, the
word American in this title means no more than that the various protogo-
nists live in America. The cultural determinism of Pound and the psychologi-
cal positivism of Llewellyn are considered defective because their systems
are not based on natural law. In the section dealing with implications of
law the word ought comes into its own. Modern jurists have attributed to
the word a psychological meaning, viz., what the law ought to be.3 Of
course, the answer to this is almost anybody's guess. Properly used, the
word ought refers to the character of law in the sense of what is obliga-
tory, and is not concerned with what ought to be, or with the tenet that
what is has experienced a becoming because it ought to be. An interesting
part of the book contains a veritable blast against the prevading ideologies
of Europe. Totalitarian regimes are condemned because they fail to accord
with the fundamental principles of natural law.
Historically, the significance of natural law is its insistence upon certain
natural rights which pre-exist the state and which must be exemplified by
all positive law. In this treatise, the following are listed as immutable:
1. P. 67.
2. Pound, Law and Morals (1926) 7, 8.
8. See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30
Col. L. Rev. 431, 439.
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"right to life; right to personal liberty; right of free speech; right of liberty
of conscience; right to private property; right to a just wage; right to
marriage; right of parent over child."'4 The mere reading of this list will
suggest to many common-law lawyers that there isn't anything absolute
about any of them. A parent's relation to a child is limited by labor and
school legislation and enforced medical attention. When separation occurs,
the right of one spouse may be denied completely. Marriage is limited by
the institution of monogamy and the prohibition of marriage between cer-
tain races. Incidentally, it would appear that the right to marriage should
be accompanied by an inherent right to divorce. However the authors deny
that a divorce may be granted on any ground. This permits the conclusion
that there is a deal of activity in forty-seven states which is wrong. The
state of South Carolina seems to be the only jurisdiction that properly re-
flects the fundamental principles of natural law. However, in this state
the effect is to cause the courts to over-work the annulment statute and to
create a floating class of people who maintain a dual residence-one for
the ordinary affairs of life and one for divorce. The right to a just wage
is a recent addition to the roster. Doubtless the impetus which resulted in
this discovery may be found in the economic distress of the last few years
and the consequent rise to power by labor. An attempt is made in the
treatise to connect the right to a just wage with the action of quantum
meruit, and thus create a respectable lineage. Quantum meruit, of course
(and emphatically), has nothing to do with wage levels. Even granting
that the laborer is entitled to a just wage, the problem remains as to what
amount is just and what machinery is available for enforcing this right
and, at the same time, remaining within the bounds of permitted actions.
When wage levels become established, an older natural right-freedom of
contract-disappears in large measure.
The inherent right to life (personal security) is the one frequently used
to establish the existence of natural rights as the substance of natural law.
In the treatise this right is illustrated by placing A and B on a desert isle
and then asking if an assault by A on B would be wrong. In other words,
personal security exists because of the nature of man and not because of
some political organization. However, no matter what answer may be made,
consideration should be given to what the answer would be if A is a China-
man and B is a Japanese. As for the right to liberty, it seems to be limited
by the possibility of military conscription, and in many states there are
highway regulations that require each citizen to work on the roads so many
days in the year. The inherent right to private property yields to the inher-
ent power of eminent domain, and in recent years the increasing difficulties
connected with getting, retaining, or using property should leave only the
optimist who can think of ownership as an absolute right.
So it seems that the claim of natural law to principles of universal
validity, which are immutable and absolute, is somewhat doubtful. However,
an exercise of reason in the light of an ideal man or an ideal state will
always play a part so long as courts are called on to decide conflicting
4. Pp. 153-199.
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claims. Today, the substance of natural law is traditional; and now that
the Whigs and Tories seem to be engaged in a dance to the death, in-
sistence upon recognition of inviolable natural rights may aid in arriving
at a compromise.
However, natural law, with its identification of law and morality, with
its ideal man in an ideal state of nature, with its insistence upon criteria
of universal validity, is only a phase of Jurisprudence. Arm-chair specula-
tion on man as man will not produce a science of law. Historically, natural
law afforded a basis for calling to question what had been received aa
authority, and today it plays an important role in filling in the gaps of the
common law. But legal science must take an account of the need for Prose-
cutor Dewey and blue ribbon juries and what it was that happened between
Swift v. Tyson5 and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.6 As to the former, one may
ask why it is that right principles are revealed only in the presence of
Mr. Dewey, and as to the latter, why it was that Justice Brandeis caught
the gleam but Justice Story failed. However, little can be gained by re-
hearsing the dissentient notions of unbelievers. In fact, the authors attempt
to forestall argument by two methods: first, by declaring that those who
disagree with them are the sort of people who do not believe that "two and
two make four"; 7 and second, by an unqualified use of such words as inher-
ent, truth, fundamental, absolute, and justice. Yet even in the light of such
a caveat, there may be among the sinful those who persist in unbelief, and
for them, the following sentence from Holmes is suggested as a complete
creed:
"The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive
state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them
and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men every-
where."8
D. M. Fsamn.t
THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED. Edited by Conyers Read. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. xviii, 424.
Offspring of a gathering of the American Historical Association met to
commemorate the sesquicentennial of the "greatest document ever struck
off at one time by the hand of man," this volume comprises twenty-seven
papers, the contributions of as many historians, economists, and political
scientists. Short but meaty, they offer within the compass of some four
hundred pages a commentary on the Constitution that combines the learning,
the judgment, and the reflection of a galaxy of intellectual stars. The
general high quality of the several essays, born to the occasion under the
aegis of a program committee chairmanned by Walton Hamilton, is matched
by the deftness with which shades of emphasis and variations in theme have
been utilized by Conyers Read in editing them for publication.
5. (1842) 16 Pet. 1.
6. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 817.
7. P. 53.
8. Holmes, Natural Law (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40.
t Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
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